Temporally Networked Cournot Platform Markets

In networked markets, information can help firms make better decisions on which market (platform), and how much, to participate. However, these markets may be temporally separated, e.g., independent system operators in different geographical locations. We model these via networked Cournot markets, but instead consider the participation of one firm to either be with the realization (or full information) of a random market, or only with the statistics of the random market, modeled by an additive zero-mean random variable on the maximal price. We show that firms not knowing the realization of the random variable would participate in both markets in the same way as if the mean was realized. We then present global effects: we prove that profit is improved for every firm when one\u27s information improves but social welfare may get better or worst with more information

Mechanism Design for Efficient Nash Equilibrium in Oligopolistic Markets

This paper investigates the efficiency loss in social cost caused by strategic bidding behavior of individual participants in a supply-demand balancing market, and proposes a mechanism to fully recover equilibrium social optimum via subsidization and taxation. We characterize the competition among supply-side firms to meet given inelastic demand, with linear supply function bidding and the proposed efficiency recovery mechanism. We show that the Nash equilibrium of such a game exists under mild conditions, and more importantly, it achieves the underlying efficient supply dispatch and the market clearing price that reflects the truthful system marginal production cost. Further, the mechanism can be tuned to guarantee self-sufficiency, i.e., taxes collected counterbalance subsidies needed. Extensive numerical case studies are run to validate the equilibrium analysis, and we employ individual net profit and a modified version of Lerner index as two metrics to evaluate the impact of the mechanism on market outcomes by varying its tuning parameter and firm heterogeneity

Online Station Assignment for Electric Vehicle Battery Swapping

This paper investigates the online station assignment for (commercial) electric vehicles (EVs) that request battery swapping from a central operator, i.e., in the absence of future information a battery swapping service station has to be assigned instantly to each EV upon its request. Based on EVs' locations, the availability of fully-charged batteries at service stations in the system, as well as traffic conditions, the assignment aims to minimize cost to EVs and congestion at service stations. Inspired by a polynomial-time offline solution via a bipartite matching approach, we develop an efficient and implementable online station assignment algorithm that provably achieves the tight (optimal) competitive ratio under mild conditions. Monte Carlo experiments on a real transportation network by Baidu Maps show that our algorithm performs reasonably well on realistic inputs, even with a certain amount of estimation error in parameters

Online Station Assignment for Electric Vehicle Battery Swapping

This paper investigates the online station assignment for (commercial) electric vehicles (EVs) that request battery swapping from a central operator, i.e., in the absence of future information a battery swapping service station has to be assigned instantly to each EV upon its request. Based on EVs' locations, the availability of fully-charged batteries at service stations in the system, as well as traffic conditions, the assignment aims to minimize cost to EVs and congestion at service stations. Inspired by a polynomial-time offline solution via a bipartite matching approach, we develop an efficient and implementable online station assignment algorithm that provably achieves the tight (optimal) competitive ratio under mild conditions. Monte Carlo experiments on a real transportation network by Baidu Maps show that our algorithm performs reasonably well on realistic inputs, even with a certain amount of estimation error in parameters